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 This paper examines the concept of self-identity as a factor that influences 
agents’ choices in moral conflicts. The main questions it concerns itself with are 
whether there is a connection between self-identity and reasoning in moral di-
lemmas and, given the strong reasons to believe that such a connection exists, 
how we should most properly understand self-identity. I examine some of the 
most notable recent contributions on the topic of personal identity, those of Sandel 
and Taylor, and find them wanting because of their one-sided interpretation of 
identity. I follow Rorty and Wong in arguing for a more heterogeneous concept of 
self-identity, which would respect the various diverse sources of personal identifi-
cation. After discussing briefly the types and sources of moral conflict, the paper 
examines two widely accepted accounts of reasoning in moral dilemmas, the po-
sition of particularist rationality and the quasi-existentialist position. This is done 
with reference to the two main issues of interest here, the extent to which these 
accounts acknowledge the importance of self-identity for moral conflict reason-
ing, and the plausibility of their conceptions of personal identity. The Aristotelian 
position of contextual reasoning is deemed unsatisfactory because it does not in-
clude considerations of self-identity among the resources for resolving the hard 
choices, and because it suffers from certain conceptual flaws. The quasi-existen-
tialist approach to reasoning in moral conflicts pays more attention to agents’ self-
identifications. However, it is found unconvincing because it focuses solely on 
one aspect of the agent’s heterogeneous identity, arguing that adopting a holistic 
view of one’s life requires choosing in line with the kind of person one wants to 
become. Conversely, this paper argues that agents can maintain the feeling that 
their choices are connected to one another by consistently choosing in line with 
any of their diverse identifications. 
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1. Introduction 
 The first assumption implied by the title of this paper is that the concept of moral 
conflict represents a viable concept in ethical theory, which is an assumption that is 
contested by such respectable ethical theories as Kantianism and utilitarianism. I shall, 
however, take the existence of moral conflicts as given and explore the possible con-
nections between self-identity and reasoning in an ethical reality that allows moral con-
flicts. This statement brings us to the next assumption adopted in this paper, which is 
that reasoning in situations of moral conflicts constitutes a type of moral reasoning. If 
this is so, then an examination of the role of self-identity in a special instantiation of 
moral reasoning, i.e. reasoning in moral conflicts, has to build on an analysis of the 
status of identity in moral reasoning in general. The discussion in this paper will follow 
this guideline. Now, it seems that a full analysis of the role of self-identity in moral rea-
soning in general would have to consist of at least three steps: first, it would have to ex-
amine whether there is a connection between considerations of self-identity and moral 
reasoning; second, it would have to provide a plausible definition of self-identity that 
enters our moral deliberations; and third, it would have to specify exactly how consid-
erations of self-identity influence our moral choices. The scope of this paper’s discus-
sion of issues related to self-identity and moral reasoning is limited, and its aim is not to 
give such a comprehensive account of the connections between the two. Due to the con-
straints of this paper’s format, I shall only deal with the first two of the mentioned ana-
lytical steps without trying to answer in what ways identity works to determine our 
moral choices. 
 These issues will be explored in the first part of this paper, which will serve as a 
preparation for the more specific discussion of the status of identity in cases of moral 
conflict that will follow. Agents’ reasoning in moral conflicts will be examined in a 
similar fashion to the way in which I shall explore moral reasoning in general, in that it 
will be concerned only with answering the following questions: “Do the accepted ac-
counts acknowledge the influence of self-identity on reasoning in moral conflicts?”, and 
“Are their interpretations of self-identity in line with the heterogeneous conception that 
is favoured in this paper?”. I will go on to examine two views of how agents resolve 
moral dilemmas, the view of particularist reasoning, inspired by Aristotle, and the 
quasi-existentialist view. 
 One more remark is in order here. The focus of this paper is on moral conflicts 
experienced by individuals, which rules out, firstly, dealing with the issue of how so-
cieties collectively make choices in situations of moral conflict. Secondly, this also 
means that we will not be looking into conceptual moral conflicts, that is, conflicts 
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2. Self-Identity and Moral Reasoning 
2.1. The concept of self-identity 
 There seem to exist two distinct ways of looking into matters of personal identity, or 
self-identity. The first of these is from the standpoint of metaphysics, which involves 
examining issues such as persistence of the self and the metaphysical status of human 
beings, and questions like “What does our existence consist of?” The metaphysical per-
spective on personal identity stresses the importance of identity, thus understood, for 
moral agency by stating that understanding what kind of beings we are helps determine 
how we ought to live. There are, however, two problems with this way of connecting 
identity and morality. First, it seems to conflate two notions: of what humans are, and of 
what is good for them, attempting to draw moral prescriptions from the metaphysical 
“essence” of being human. However, the claim that the actuality of human existence, 
when fully grasped, can provide the answer to how people should live is not as incon-
testable as it may seem. Another problem with the metaphysical approach is that it pro-
duces a very thin account of personal identity, abstracting from the richness of agents’ 
inner lives and the context within which their identities are constituted. Due to its ana-
lytic detachment, this approach comes close to losing sight of real human subjects. 
 The second approach to self-identity, advocated by theorists like Michael Sandel and 
Charles Taylor, asserts that any ethical system developed on the basis of statements 
about such a truncated self is necessarily impoverished because it distorts our lives be-
yond recognition. Our philosophical concept of self-identity has to be thicker in order to 
be applicable because “it is this more robust sense of identity that we seek to capture 
when we aim at self-understanding, when we attempt to engage and comprehend others, 
and when we make judgments about character, worth, and responsibility” (Flanagan and 
Rorty, 1990: 3). 
 What is, then, self-identity in this more robust interpretation? This question com-
prises at least two sub-questions: “What does it mean for an agent to have self-iden-
tity?”, and “What are the sources of one’s self-identity?”.1 They are closely linked but 
for the sake of the present discussion I shall try to separate them and examine at this 
point the former, returning to the latter in the next section. First of all, it has to be said 
that a sense of identity is not a part of our natural physiological constitution, which is to 
say that “we are not selves in the way that we are organisms, or we don’t have selves in 
the way we have hearts and livers” (Taylor, 1990: 34). It is quite possible to imagine a 
human being that wouldn’t possess the developed image of her unique self that we nor-
mally call identity: presumably, we could expect to find this in a child raised by wild 
animals, without any contact with humans. Having a sense of identity, then, differs from 
having a heart or a liver in that it is constituted by our own efforts. Man is a “self-inter-
preting animal” (Taylor, 1994: 189), which is also why it is more accurate to say that 
 
1 Another question related to these issues is certainly “How does one become aware of one’s self-
identity?”, which would require looking into the self-interpretative processes through which one gains self-
knowledge and establishes links of identification with sources of one’s identity, such as social roles, group 
membership and so on. This is certainly an interesting topic but I cannot pursue it further here. 
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identity is developed through self-reflection, instead of being firmly fixed at any point in 
time. 
 More substantively, it can be said that the notion of concrete identity discussed here 
differs from identity in the metaphysical sense insofar as it refers to the identity of par-
ticular agents rather than the identity of humans qua humans. Since identity in the for-
mer sense is not only personal but also personalized, it involves developing a particular 
image of one’s unique self that is not comprised in the concept of metaphysical identity. 
Concrete identity can be understood as pertaining to the traits that make an agent who 
she is, foremost in her own eyes; it “reflects the whole structure of her character, the 
traits that are central to her capacities for agency” (Flanagan and Rorty, 1990: 3). Iden-
tity traits influence moral reasoning because in order for an obligation to make sense to 
an individual she ultimately has to define herself as the addressee of that same obliga-
tion. Moreover, it can be plausibly argued that self-identity sets limits to what the agent 
considers imaginable or viable: even in situations of radical choice “that choice requires 
self-knowledge, for surely… one cannot become just anyone one chooses to be” (Put-
nam, 1990: 74). Therefore, exploring moral reasoning without paying due attention to 
the way it is influenced by agents’ identifications, the reverse relation also holding, 
doesn’t seem justified. Having examined the more robust notion of identity and its con-
nection with agents’ moral deliberations, we shall now turn our attention to the question 
of which traits should be regarded as central to an agent’s identity, or the question of 
sources of self-identification. 
 
2.2. Sources of self-identity 
 2.2.1. Sandel’s situated self 
 Political and moral philosophers have attempted to incorporate their conceptions of 
personal identity into broader schemes of moral agency. A notable recent contribution 
in this field has been that of Michael Sandel, most clearly articulated in his Liberalism 
and the Limits of Justice. His views can be interpreted as a direct reaction to, and criti-
cism of, John Rawls’ understanding of the moral self in A Theory of Justice.2 I shall, 
therefore, first present Rawls’ view of the moral subject as an antecedently individuated 
self, constituted without reference to any particular ends. This will be followed by an 
examination of Sandel’s objections and of his conception of the self as formed through 
pursuit of certain shared goals. 
 The most fundamental feature of Rawls’ moral subject is that it does not owe its 
identity to any ends, which is a reflection of his position that “in justice as fairness the 
concept of right is prior to that of the good” (Rawls, 1973: 31). Desires and their objects 
are not constitutive of our identity, which is the same as saying that we do not normally 
regard ourselves as mere sums of our ends. Individuals change through the courses of 
 
2 Sandel criticised three main features of Rawls’ moral subject: its detachment from any ends, its 
plurality, and its inability to access others subjects’ minds. I shall only examine the first Sandel’s criticism as 
it seems to be the most relevant for the present discussion, for two reasons: first, it is the most fundamental of 
the three, and second, it makes the most direct claims about the sources of personal identity. 
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their lifetimes as do their conceptions of what is good for them, but this does not mean 
that their entire personalities change. The relation between ends and the self can best be 
understood as possession: ends are of a person, not the person itself. As Sandel’s inter-
pretation suggests (Sandel, 1982: 8), Rawls also seems to be employing a conceptual 
argument to back up his understanding of the self, which consists in saying that we 
could not imagine self-knowledge without postulating the existence of a stable antece-
dently individuated self. 
 Sandel proposes quite a different approach to understanding the moral subject, 
building on the contention that the good is essential for the formation and cultivation of 
one’s identity. He regards Rawls’ perspective incoherent because it deprives the subject 
of attributes that are indispensable for any agency. In his criticism of the first feature of 
Rawls’ moral subject, Sandel contends that ends make one who one is and that there is 
no self-definition without a notion of what one wants to achieve. We become aware of 
our unique personalities and capacities, he argues, through pursuit of goals that rank as 
valuable in our conception of the good. It is not only that the individual cannot be 
thought immune to influences from her social context; for Sandel, she is radically situ-
ated, that is, her identity is shaped by her ends and social environment. On the concep-
tual level, he argues that the self-reflection Rawls invokes is not true self-reflection at 
all, first, because an antecedently given self cannot a posteriori be revised in the light of 
reflection and, second, because it would consist of contingent attributes that cannot 
properly be regarded a subject of deep introspection (Sandel, 1982: 160-161). 
 It can be unclear how one can come to posses certain goals if not by choosing them. 
Sandel’s answer is that the way one comes by her ends should best be understood as 
discovering them. In order for that to be possible there must exist a set of goals that are 
prior to the individual and within which she can situate herself, which is where Sandel 
turns to the concept of communal ends. He sees human agency as a sort of dialogical 
relation of the individual with shared communal conceptions of the good, which con-
sists in finding one’s place within this framework of shared values, as well as trying to 
best harmonize them with the present needs and circumstances. 
 Sandel seems to be justified in criticizing Rawls’ view of the moral subject as the 
latter leaves us with an extremely thin core of the self, incapable of moral agency be-
cause it is deprived of any frame of reference. The way in which such a self is consti-
tuted is also quite mysterious, since its foundations exist prior to any projects and ends, 
which is why Sandel rightly refers to Rawls’ conception as “voluntaristic”. Many of 
Sandel’s own assertions possess a high degree of plausibility, especially his account of 
the connectedness of the self to its social environment. However, there is a sense in 
which his whole conception of the moral self overestimates the social component of 
persons’ identities. While it is true that one’s partaking in certain communal concep-
tions of the good can represent a significant aspect of one’s identity, there is surely 
much more to be said about self-identity. An individual has resources at her disposal to 
rationally scrutinize the societal understanding of the good life, and if she finds it 
wanting she has the capacity to change how she stands in relation to it. Not all aspects 
of one’s identity flow from the communal vision of the good; on the contrary, “many of 
us have deep moral reservations about the very structures that have traditionally defined 
identity” (Rorty and Wong, 1990: 30). For example, the self-perception and projects of 
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a physically disabled person can clash with what a traditionalist society expects from 
that person. 
 Therefore, it seems that the conception of self-identity should be broadened to in-
clude more than the social component. In the text that follows I shall examine Charles 
Taylor’s account of self-identity as constituted primarily by the self’s rational inward-
directed reflection on its desires and attachments. 
 
 2.2.2. Taylor and strong evaluation 
 We have seen how Sandel attempts to establish the centrality of social conceptions 
of the good life to the individuals’ self-identification and, in turn, their capacities for 
moral agency. Charles Taylor also wishes to connect matters of “concrete” personal 
identity that is thicker than in the Rawlsian interpretation to the way we practically de-
liberate on moral issues. However, the main focus of his analysis and the conclusions he 
reaches are very different to Sandel’s and can, in fact, provide grounds for a critique of 
social identity. Taylor builds on the work of Harry Frankfurt in at least two respects: 
first, he adopts Frankfurt’s distinction between first and second-order desires, and sec-
ond, he argues that strong or second-order evaluation lays the foundations of an agent’s 
identity, which echoes Frankfurt’s argument from The Importance of What We Care 
About. I shall now look in more detail into the way Taylor develops these themes and 
examine the plausibility of his account of self-identity. 
 Taylor employs Frankfurt’s well-known distinction between first- and second-order 
desires (Frankfurt, 1988a: 12) as a basis for drawing the distinction between strong and 
weak evaluation. Second-order desires involve reflection that is qualitatively different 
from and higher than reflecting on how to satisfy simple wants to have or do things, as 
this means evaluating desires themselves and deeming some of them “better”, “nobler” 
or “more fulfilling” than others. The concept of first- and second-order desires is re-
flected to a great extent in Taylor’s notion of weak and strong evaluation: “Whereas a 
reflection about what we feel like more, which is all a simple weigher can do in assess-
ing motivations, keeps us as it were at the periphery; a reflection on the kind of beings 
we are takes us to the center of our existence as agents.” (Taylor, 1977: 114-115). As 
Flanagan notes, Taylor’s weak evaluator can make qualitative assessments but they 
“either do not involve her own motives, desires, and inclinations, or if they do, they in-
volve only non-ethical assessment of these motives, desires, and inclinations” 
(Flanagan, 1990: 39). Furthermore, it has to be noted that when painting strong evalua-
tors as persons making ethical assessments of their desires, Taylor refers to a relatively 
broad understanding of the ethical, which includes not only concern for obligations and 
rights, but also a wide range of intrapersonal concerns – how one should live, what one 
should care about, and so on. 
 The final step in Taylor’s account of the self is arguing that the agent’s identity is 
defined by her fundamental strong evaluations: “[T]he claim is that living within such 
strongly qualified horizons is constitutive of human agency, that stepping outside these 
limits would be tantamount to stepping outside what we would recognize as integral, 
that is, undamaged human personhood.” (Taylor, 1990: 27) This passage seems to echo 
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Frankfurt’s idea that identity is constituted by what we care most about, or that “a per-
son who cares about something is, as it were, invested in it” (Frankfurt, 1988b: 83). 
 It is now time to ask whether Taylor’s understanding of personal identity can be 
considered more compelling than Sandel’s account of the socially situated self. Taylor 
starts from a very plausible assumption, which is that one’s plans, projects, and com-
mitments can have a major influence on one’s self-perception. However, there are two 
sets of objections that can be raised against his views: one concerning the way he devel-
ops this underlying idea, and another concerning the scope of his conclusions. Firstly, 
one might follow Flanagan in noting (Flanagan, 1990: 53-54) that Taylor’s picture of 
the self appears overly intellectualist, not allowing for identity in people whose lives are 
driven by certain cares and commitments but who are inarticulate about them. Secondly, 
his strong focus on the ethical nature of strong evaluations does not seem justified: one 
could, after all, imagine an admirable person with a fully developed personal identity 
that would be guided by a variety of non-ethical concerns. An objection of another sort 
would concede the validity of many of Taylor’s points concerning ideal identity but 
state that it neglects other aspects of agents’ identities. The self-perception of, say, a 
physically handicapped person can be strongly shaped not only by her image of the 
fully realized person she would like to become but also by her social environment’s per-
ception and, in some cases, negative expectations of her. In this sense, “if practical de-
liberation attempts to change the actual in favor of the ideal, it must pay attention to the 
ways in which the ideal is constrained by the intractable” (Rorty and Wong, 1990: 31). 
Therefore, Taylor’s one-sided interpretation, which focuses solely on the self’s capacity 
for ethical evaluation of its first-order desires remains unsatisfactory, calling for a 
broader exploration of self-identity. This will be discussed in the text that follows. 
 
 2.2.3. Heterogeneous self-identity 
 The main weakness of Sandel’s and Taylor’s accounts of personal identity, as we 
have seen, is that they portray only one constituent of personal identity as fundamental, 
while neglecting the importance of certain others. A more realistic perspective has to 
acknowledge that there are many possible sources of identification, none of which nec-
essarily takes precedence over others in general. This can be taken to mean at least two 
things: firstly, that in a given society different individuals can exhibit different patterns 
of self-identification. Some may think of themselves primarily in terms of their mem-
bership of a certain national community; others may think that what mostly constitutes 
their identity is striving to become a particular kind of person, such as kind, honest or 
caring; still others may think that their social role, like that of a teacher or a human 
rights activist, is what best defines them. But, secondly, the claim about the heterogene-
ity of self-identity also means that personal self-identifications are not firmly fixed and 
they that can shift through the course of individuals’ lives. Someone who sees herself as 
a punk-rocker in her youth can become, say, completely immersed in her job as a City 
investment banker later in life. 
 Rorty and Wong have offered an interesting account of personal identity that recog-
nizes its heterogeneity and pays attention to its various social and psychological aspects. 
They start from the claim already advanced here, that “a person’s identity is constituted 
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by a configuration of central traits” (Rorty and Wong, 1990: 19), which are those traits 
“that typically make a systematic difference to the course of a person’s life, to the habit-
forming and action-guiding social categories in which she is placed, to the way that she 
acts, reacts, and interacts” (Rorty and Wong, 1990: 19). 
 They suggest the following as the traits constituent of self-identity, in a roughly 
psychogenetic developmental order: somatic dispositions, temperamental or psycho-
logical traits, social role identity, socially defined group identity, and ideal identity. 
Bodily dispositions (as muscularly strong or weak, quick or sluggish, slender or heavy) 
are one of the first sources of a child’s self-identification and often retain their impor-
tance throughout a person’s life because social norms portray many somatic qualities as 
desirable or undesirable, which affects their bearers’ self-definition. Because this is so, 
they can also affect a person’s beliefs and plans. Central temperamental or psychologi-
cal traits, such as aggression or friendliness, trustfulness or distrustfulness, can also be 
said to shape one’s sense of self-identity, in that they can often induce the development 
of certain motives and habits while deterring others, so that, for instance, a shy person 
can be expected to avoid social interaction and develop the self-image of a recluse. 
Cultural narratives, popular songs and stories also normally deliver ready-made images 
of most psychological dispositions, with reference to which agents orient themselves. 
Another powerful source of self-identification can be social roles, by which Rorty and 
Wong mean not only the roles defined by established institutions and practices (such as 
family and occupational roles), but also those provided by social narratives (such as the 
roles of “the villain”, “the big brother” and “the rebel”). It is not uncommon to see a 
person adopting the behaviour and attitudes attached to her role of, say, a professional 
soldier, as a part of her self-understanding and then exhibiting these traits in spheres of 
life that are not directly related to the role itself, such as parental or romantic relation-
ships. As multiculturalist and feminist theorists readily emphasize, membership of a so-
cial group can generate strong feelings of solidarity and identification with the group on 
the part of its members, so that one can see oneself primarily as an Italian, or a Muslim, 
or a homosexual. Finally, a persuasive account of the patterns of self-identification has 
to allow for the agents’ creative impulse and their capacity for second-order evaluation 
of their desires, whether we understand this evaluation as purely ethical in nature, as 
Taylor seems to, or as comprising non-ethical considerations as well. An individual’s 
life can revolve around her efforts to become morally worthier, more sophisticated, or 
more rational, to the extent that she identifies her personality with striving to meet these 
standards. The various traits and dispositions listed here combine in a unique way to 
constitute a singular configuration of a person’s self-identity, and even though they can 
be seen as independent, they are often mutually reinforcing, constraining, or conflicting. 
 
3. Moral Conflicts 
 We have so far explored the role of self-identity in moral reasoning in general, 
which is necessary if one wants to inquire about the importance of identity in a specific 
instantiation of moral reasoning, that in cases of moral conflict. The latter issue is this 
paper’s main point of interest, but in order to make any conclusions about it we now 
have to examine in some detail the types and sources of moral conflict. It is beyond the 
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scope of this paper to present a defence of the category of moral conflict against ethical 
theories that deny its viability, although it seems to me that a lot can be said in its fa-
vour. Instead, I will here take the existence of moral dilemmas as given and examine 
their structure, discussing the role of self-identity in an ethical reality that allows con-
flicts in the next section. 
 On Lukes’ account, there are four forms of moral conflict: first, conflict of obliga-
tions; second, conflict between ends, or goals; third, conflict between moral codes, or 
worldviews; and lastly, that between different kinds of moral claim (Lukes, 1989: 129-
132).3 Probably the most widely discussed example of moral conflict, that of Sartre’s 
pupil having to decide whether to join the Free French Forces in order to help defend 
his country or to stay alongside his elderly mother, is a case of conflicting obligations. 
Moral conflict between ends, or goals, is experienced, for instance, by an agent that has 
to choose between leading a slow and somewhat routine life without much stress and 
having a more dynamic and diverse lifestyle, but at the cost of a faster pace and much 
stress. Conflict between moral codes, or worldviews, is “marked by incompatibilities of 
perception and belief” (Lukes, 1989: 130), and refers mainly to the differing concep-
tions of good and bad in different communities. The disagreement between the Muslim 
community and the British liberal majority over the free distribution of Salman Rush-
die’s Satanic Verses was an example of such a conflict. Finally, different kinds of moral 
claim, such as deontological and consequentialist, conflict on the conceptual level be-
cause they make irreconcilable moral requirements, such as to maximize overall utility 
and to respect individual rights at the same time. Of these four forms of moral conflict, 
only the first three fall into the category of conflicts experienced by individuals, which 
is the focus of this paper. In the rest of the discussion I will, consequently, not refer to 
conflicts on the deeper conceptual level. 
 The monist view that all goods or values can be subsumed under some overarching 
value or principle, is a fundamental constituent of many well-established ethical theo-
ries, including the Kantian and utilitarian. In opposition to these conceptions, some 
philosophers have in the last fifty years or so begun to take seriously the idea that per-
sons can sometimes be confronted with conflicts of values that are radically diverse and 
incompatible. This feature of the moral life is especially emphasized in the works of 
theorists that subscribe to the position of value pluralism, whose basic tenet, on Lar-
more’s account, is that “there are many viable conceptions of the good life that neither 
represent different versions of some single, homogeneous good nor fall into any dis-
cernible hierarchy” (Larmore, 1987: 23). The pluralist view is that moral values, norms, 
ideals, duties and virtues are irreducibly diverse; the view that “the world that we en-
counter in ordinary experience is one in which we are faced with choices between ends 
equally ultimate, and claims equally absolute, the realisation of some of which must in-
evitably involve the sacrifice of others” (Berlin, 2002: 213-214). 
 
3 When discussing value conflicts most theorists of value pluralism use the term “values” to refer to both 
obligations and ends, although the term “values” can, in a narrower interpretation, signify just ends, or goals. 
In this paper I am following the practice of pluralist philosophers and using “values” as a broader category 
that comprises obligations and ends. 
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 The claim that values are plural opens the door to the possibility of conflicts because 
more than one of such values can pertain to some situation of choice. But the plurality 
of values alone is insufficient to produce moral conflicts that we would characterize as 
“hard” or “tragic”. What makes our choices so difficult is that values are not only plural 
but also incommensurable, or so value pluralists argue. As Crowder notes, there are 
three ways of interpreting this claim: it can mean that values are incomparable, immeas-
urable, or unrankable (Crowder, 2002: 49-54). Of these three notions, it is relatively 
least contestable that incommensurability involves immeasurability, which means that 
there is no common denominator, or currency, in which conflicting plural values can be 
expressed. The claim that incommensurability involves unrankability is stronger than 
the claim of immeasurability, stating that the heterogeneity of values entails that we 
cannot produce a consistent ranking of alternatives that would hold in general. Finally, 
the strongest interpretation of incommensurability states that values are incomparable, 
similar to the way in which tea and beer, or Aeschylus and Shakespeare in Gray’s ex-
ample (Gray, 1995: 51), are incomparable. Values like justice and friendship, it can be 
argued, have very different motivational force as they appeal to different aspects of 
one’s personality; therefore, trying to compare them would be like trying to compare 
two different worlds that have nothing in common. This is why Raz contends that in-
comparability “marks the inability of reason to guide our action” (Raz, 1986: 334). As a 
conclusion, it can be said that irrespective of how we understand incommensurability, it 
appears to significantly hinder the capacity of our reason to provide a better case for one 
of the values in conflict. 
 
4. Moral Conflicts and Self-Identity 
 The previous chapter has determined the specific obstacles that rational deliberation 
faces in situations of moral conflicts. However, many theorists argue that while it is true 
that having to compare incommensurable values seriously challenges our capacity to 
decide which of the options is better, we still somehow manage to make “nonarbitrary 
choices in these predicaments” (Taylor, 1997: 170). As Williams phrases it (Williams, 
1973: 185), people normally have some reasons for choosing an ought over another, no 
matter how difficult the dilemma is. This is not to suggest that one of the oughts is 
eliminated in such situations: while thinking that she made the correct choice, the agent 
may at the same time feel genuine regret for failing to do what she also ought to have 
done. The first question is, then, “What grounds her belief that she did the right thing, 
despite the validity of the two oughts?”, which is the same as asking “What counts as 
the better option when both are good in a sense?”.4 The second question to be posed 
here is: “Is there a connection between the justifications of choices among plural values 
and considerations of self-identity?”. One approach to moral conflict reasoning holds 
that the resources for making a rational choice are provided by context, while the quasi-
existentialist approach focuses on the holistic picture of one’s life. 
 
4 The flipside of this question is, of course, “What counts as the less bad option when both are bad in a 
sense?”, which can also be asked in many situations of moral conflict. For the sake of simplicity I only discuss 
choices among options that are good in a sense, although it can be presumed that similar claims could be made 
about the case of incomparably bad options. 
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4.1. Particularist reasoning 
 Some philosophers argue that a good acquaintance with the context of choice en-
ables us to rationally resolve hard dilemmas because “specification of context reveals 
the values that are most important to us, hence the values that guide choice” (Crowder, 
2002: 57-58). Thus, Nussbaum insists in the Aristotelian vein that practical reasoning is 
always and necessarily particularist, so that while no general rules can be formulated to 
apply to all cases of ethical judgement, the person of practical wisdom is able to find the 
best course of action in any particular case (Nussbaum, 1990: 59). Choices among val-
ues are qualitative rather than quantitative. The proper understanding of the context en-
ables us to make these qualitative choices because it elucidates, on Crowder’s account 
(Crowder, 2002: 60-62), the facts and values that are relevant to the choice. Certain 
facts set limits to what can be chosen, in line with the slogan “ought implies can”. An-
other constituent of choice are the agent’s values, that is, her background conception of 
the good, which serves as a standard for deciding what matters to her in the circum-
stances. 
 The position of particularist reasoning offers a good critique of the view that stresses 
maximization as the rational standard, in that it rightly points to the fact that in the cir-
cumstances of moral conflict people normally choose an alternative for what it means to 
them and not for the consequences it will produce. However, it has to be deemed unsat-
isfactory because of its apparent disregard for the way considerations of self-identity in-
fluence personal choices in moral conflicts. On the Aristotelian view, the only resource 
for resolving hard moral dilemmas available to the agent is knowledge of the facts and 
values that are relevant to choice. In fact, it is quite plausible to maintain that delibera-
tion on one’s self-image represents another such resource. This can be said for at least 
two reasons: first, the agent’s self-definition at least partly shapes her view of which 
obligations refer to her in some specific situation, and second, options that conflict with 
one’s self-identity are seen by the agent as non-viable, or unthinkable. 
 There is also a sense in which this account of reasoning in moral conflicts insuffi-
ciently explains the actual process of deliberation and what it is guided by. If practical 
wisdom consists in choosing what is right with regard to the context, then saying that 
one should choose among incomparable values as a person of practical wisdom would is 
true by definition, but is not very helpful. Another feature of this interpretation that ren-
ders it unsatisfactory is its unclarity: it does not give an unambiguous account of the 
considerations of the good that are to serve as the basis for choosing among viable op-
tions. More specifically, it is not clear what level of deliberation about the good this 
conception has in mind, as it can be argued that agents experience the value of a specific 
friendship relationship differently from the value of friendship in their life in general. It 
seems that the Aristotelian view has to refer to the more holistic interpretation of the 
good in contextual reasoning, because it is precisely the conflict on the level of specific 
values that characterizes hard moral dilemmas. On this point the Aristotelian perspec-
tive seems to strongly converge with the next interpretation of reasoning in cases of 
value conflict, the quasi-existentialist, without expressly acknowledging it. I shall now, 
therefore, discuss the distinction between different kinds of reasoning about values in 
some detail, and examine how theorists like Charles Taylor and John Gray make use of 
it in their quasi-existentialist accounts of practical deliberation. 
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4.2. The quasi-existentialist approach and self-identity 
 An important distinction that is often hinted at but rarely explicitly stated is that be-
tween reasoning about values, and reasoning about the way values relate to one another 
in the complete picture of one’s life. When reasoning about values we are concerned 
with, first, our obligations and their justification, and second, with the identification of 
proper ends and of goods that are associated or conflicting with the pursuit of those ends 
(Becker, 1992: 711-712). Another sort of reasoning about the good consists in consid-
ering what is good from the perspective of one’s whole life, rather than what is good in 
some specific circumstances. An option can be rationally very suited to some particular 
context and the agent’s obligations and ends, and yet not get chosen if some other op-
tion is more in line with the general direction of the choices the agent has made in the 
past and intends to make in the future. As Taylor’s puts it, there is an aspect of our 
sense of good and right that refers to how goods fit together in a whole life (Taylor, 
1997: 179-180). 
 However, it is important not to overstate this point. It can reasonably be argued that 
people are guided in most of their everyday choices by the prospect of satisfaction of 
relatively immediate and palpable desires and interests. Putnam refers to this dimension 
of the ethical as the “normal moral life”, in which choices are made “against a back-
ground of (relatively) stable values by a (relatively) stable character in more or less sta-
ble conditions and not very surprising situations” (Putnam, 1990: 72). This routine is at 
times interrupted by moments of crisis, moral dilemmas, when an individual can no 
longer rely on established values because these very values are in conflict with one an-
other. Difficult cases of value conflict, such as whether to lie in order to help a friend, 
can provoke intense inner unsettlement, calling for a radical re-assessment of almost 
everything a person holds dear. Such situations require making a decision that is more 
fundamental than deciding whether we consider this or that person a friend, or whether 
this or that utterance is a lie: we must decide what place honesty and friendship have in 
our life, and will continue to have in the future. In such situations “we are called to 
choose the kind of life we mean to have” (Gray, 2000: 64-65). 
 The quasi-existentialist position seems to capture correctly the gravity and creativity 
contained in choices of the sort discussed here. It is, therefore, appropriate to explore 
whether and to what extent it fits with this paper’s more general account of the role of 
self-identity in practical reasoning. The reader will recall the general line of my argu-
ment, which states that considerations of self-identity represent a significant factor that 
influences our practical reasoning. Hence, the questions to be asked now are: “Does the 
quasi-existentialist approach acknowledge the impact of concrete identity on agents’ 
deliberation?”, and “If so, how satisfactory is its account of self-identity as a factor in 
deliberation?”. First off, Gray and Taylor’s positions are strongly reminiscent of Tay-
lor’s concept of strong evaluation in that they claim that the agent chooses according to 
her vision of the kind of person she wants to become. These views are, then, an affir-
mation of the familiar thesis that self-identity influences personal choices, but self-iden-
tity of a special sort, completely directed towards the future. This can be recognized, for 
example, in Gray’s claim that what a person in a moral dilemma confronts is “a choice 
of the self she means to be” (Gray, 2000: 65). Therefore, in response to the first ques-
tion from above it can be said that the quasi-existentialist approach acknowledges the 
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importance of personal identity, but also that it contains two particular features: firstly, 
it claims that the agent’s sense of self-identity is constituted by her own evaluative 
judgements of her desires and character, and secondly, it claims that this kind of identity 
fully determines her choices in value conflicts. These peculiarities bring us to the sec-
ond question from above, the question of tenability of this conception’s account of per-
sonal identity. Since this paper is not interested in examining exactly how self-identity 
influences agents’ deliberations, it is not of our concern to assess the plausibility of the 
second feature from above. Regarding the first of these features, it is worth restating that 
the concept of ideal identity cannot be thought to capture the totality of agents’ identifi-
cations. As was previously argued, a more realistic understanding of self-identity also 
includes such sources of self-definition as somatic dispositions, temperamental traits, 
social roles and group membership. This means that orientation with respect to the self 
one wants to become is not the only way in which a person can achieve consistency of 
her life choices. The agent can direct her choices to “fit together in a whole life” by 
opting consistently for the options that are, say, in line with her self-definition as a sin-
gle parent, a homosexual, or a physically disabled person. She can, accordingly, try to 
resolve her moral dilemmas by persistently saying, “I shall act as any single parent 
would”, or by invoking some other of her heterogeneous identifications. 
 I conclude that the quasi-existentialist view is more compelling than the position of 
particularist rationality in its treatment of the role of self-identity in moral conflicts, be-
cause it acknowledges the importance of self-image for moral choices, which the Aris-
totelian position does not do. However, this perspective has to be supplemented with the 
insight that self-identity refers to more than just one’s vision of the traits and virtues one 
wishes to develop, including also the identifications arising from one’s somatic disposi-
tions, temperamental traits, social roles and group membership. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 This paper has examined the concept of self-identity as a factor that has a bearing on 
agents’ reasoning in moral conflicts. This has been done in connection with the more 
general issue of the role of self-identity in moral reasoning. The discussion has shown 
that considerations of self-identity influence our deliberation on moral issues in general, 
insofar as they inform the agent of her obligations in specific situations of choice, and 
help the agent discover the options that are “unthinkable” for her. A realistic perspective 
of self-identity should acknowledge the many possible sources of identification, none of 
which necessarily takes precedence over others in general. This means, first, that in a 
given society different individuals can exhibit different patterns of self-identification; 
and second, that personal self-identifications are not firmly fixed and they that can shift 
through the course of individuals’ lives. In this respect, the account presented here dif-
fers sharply from one-dimensional conceptions of self-identity, such as Sandel’s and 
Taylor’s, which have been rejected because of their disregard for the diversity of per-
sonal identifications. After establishing the validity and content of the concept of self-
identity in moral reasoning, this paper moved on to explore how the concept of self-
identity applies to deliberating in moral conflicts. This was done with reference to two 
influential interpretations of rationality in moral conflicts: the Aristotelian position of 
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particularist reasoning and the view that focuses on the holistic picture of one’s life. Our 
first aim was to assess the extent to which these accounts of reasoning in moral conflicts 
incorporate identity-related considerations. The Aristotelian perspective was found 
wanting in this regard, since it makes no mention of deliberation on one’s self-image as 
a possible resource for resolving hard choices. In addition, careful examination reveals 
that it also contains certain conceptual weaknesses. These conclusions removed the 
contextual position form further discussion. Our second aim was to examine the ten-
ability of the account that the remaining quasi-existentialist conception gives of self-
identity. This conception’s interpretation of self-identity was found unconvincing be-
cause orientation with respect to the self one wants to become is not the only way in 
which a person can achieve consistency of her life choices. One can also maintain the 
feeling that one’s choices are mutually connected if one consistently chooses in line 
with some other of her diverse identifications, such as those related to one’s group 
membership, or one’s social role. 
 The role of self-identity in moral conflicts is a very engaging topic for philosophical 
investigation, but I could not aim to cover it entirely here. A more detailed study of the 
role of self-identity in moral conflicts would have to include a step which this discus-
sion of the concept of self-identity has not made. This step would consist of explaining 
exactly how one’s self definition influences one’s choices in moral dilemmas, and 
would have to involve discussing such issues as what it means to attend to one’s identity 
in hard choices, whether cultivation of one’s identity is an end of some sort or a pre-
evaluative disposition, whether one can choose to ignore the intimations of one’s self-
understanding, and the like. I presume that the examination of these issues would have 
to be considerably more comprehensive than my discussion here. However, I believe 
that this paper’s conclusions about the moral status of agents’ heterogeneous self-identi-
fications can serve as a solid starting point for more detailed investigations of the role of 
identity in moral conflicts to be done in the future. 
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